In the summer of 2017, the International Law Commission adopted a draft article on exceptions to immunity. The draft article adopted provides that immunity ratione materiae does not apply with respect to certain international crimes, namely crimes against humanity, the crime of genocide, war crimes, the crime of apartheid, torture and enforced disappearances. These exceptions do not apply to immunity ratione personae.
Introduction
Few issues can claim to have dominated the recent attention of international law, both on academic and practical levels, like the law relating to immunities. 1 The discourse on immunities has focused particularly on the question whether international law, as it currently stands, recognises exceptions to immunities and, if it does not, whether it should.
This debate on immunities, and particularly whether there are or should be exceptions to immunity is a reflection of a broader tussle for the soul of international law. 2 In this debate, those seeking to build a brave new world in international law, argue for less recognition of immunities and more recognition of exceptions to immunities. 3 This approach, it is imagined, will lead to a better, more humane world, in which those that commit atrocious acts against fellow human beings are held to account. 4 In this world, imagined by those holding out for the brave new international law, leaders, knowing that immunity will not protect them against accountability, will think twice before committing crimes against their own populations. On the other side of the spectrum are those that recall the words of the International Court of Justice that immunity does not mean impunity because, even without creating exceptions to immunity, there are avenues for justice and accountability. 5 For these commentators and actors, a better world depends on the stability of international relations and not on some nostalgic appeal to values. 6 They are inspired by the words of the International Court of Justice that immunity 'derive[s] from the principle of sovereign equality of States, which is …one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order' and 'occupies an important place in international law and international relations. ' 7 This debate has played itself out also in the International Law Commission in its consideration of the topic immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. In the Commission, the debate commenced in 2008 when the topic of immunities was placed on the agenda of the Commission. The debate was particularly pointed in 2011 when the Commission considered then-Special Rapporteur Roman Kolodkin's second report which was centred around the distinction between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae, 8 of immunity ratione personae -the 'all-powerful' type of immunity that applies to both private and official acts committed by certain high-ranking officials. In other words, the Commission had to answer the question which high-ranking officials would have the benefit of this all-powerful type of immunity. That round was won by those erring on the side of stability of international relations, with only three out of thirty-four members opposing the extension of immunity ratione personae beyond heads of State to all the troika (heads of State, heads of government and Minister for Foreign Affairs). 9 In 2017, during the Commission's sixty-ninth session, the debate re-emerged, this time in the context of whether there were any exceptions to immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction. Unlike the round on the scope of immunity ratione personae, this round would belong to those seeking a brave new world. In this round, against great resistance from some members, the Commission adopted draft article 7, which provided an exception for immunity ratione materiae in respect of certain core crimes under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and enforced disappearances. 10 These are acts the prohibition of which constitute violations of jus cogens norms -for convenience sake, I refer to these crimes as jus cogens crimes.
The significance of this decision is demonstrated in the tension and deep divisions in the Commission in the process and following the adoption of draft article 7. The decision was arrived at after two votes -voting is a rare event in the Commission. The initial vote, an indicative vote, 11 was required to send the draft article as proposed by the Special Rapporteur in the fifth report to the drafting committee. The adoption of draft article 7 by the Commission was done after a recorded vote accompanied by strongly worded explanations of vote. 12 In the vote, twenty-one members voted in favour of the draft article, 13 while eight members voted against, 14 with one-member abstaining. 15 The outcome has already been the subject of a symposium published in 9 In addition to the current author, Mr Petrič and Mr Murase were the only members of the Commission that supported a restricted scope of immunity ratione personae. members opposed to draft article 7, however, it constituted neither codification nor progressive development. In their view, draft article 7 constituted 'new law' which has no basis whatsoever in the practice of States and therefore ought not to be included. In their view, if adopted, draft article 7 had to be clearly classified as new law or, at best, progressive development.
There are probably many different ways to explain the shift from a 'pro-stability' to a 'pro-brave world' approach in the Commission in the four years that elapsed between the adoption of draft article 3 on the scope of immunity ratione personae and draft article 7 on exceptions to immunity. It might, for example, be argued that the question of the scope of immunity ratione personae is different from the question whether there are exceptions to immunity ratione materiae. It might also be suggested that the change in the composition of the Commission in 2017 might be responsible for the shift in position. These are empirical questions that call for speculation and fall beyond the scope of this article. This article has a more narrow, doctrinal focus, seeking to evaluate the outcome of the ILC deliberations against the practice of State. In the next section the article will provide a background to draft article 7 adopted by the Commission, including a brief overview of the report on which draft article 7 is based and the various arguments advanced against the adoption of draft article 7. Section 3 of the article will assess, against the background of the debate of the Commission, draft article 7 and whether it has a basis in the practice of States. Finally, the article will offer some concluding remarks.
Before proceeding with the discussion of draft article 7 of the draft articles on immunities of State officials, it is necessary to make a few preliminary remarks delineating the scope of the article. Since this article provides a commentary on the current work of the Commission on immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, its scope will be similar to that of the Commission's draft articles. 23 Thus, the article will be limited to immunities of officials under customary international law and does not extend the immunity of the state itself, or immunities addressed in treaty regimes such as the immunities of diplomats under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Similarly, since the scope of the Commission's work address immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction, the possible immunity from the jurisdiction of international criminal courts is excluded from the scope of the current article. 23 See for the scope, Draft 
Background to Draft Article 7 Adopted by the Commission
A.
An Overview of the Report of the Special Rapporteur
The Special Rapporteur submitted her fifth report on immunities, covering exceptions to immunity, during the sixty-eighth session in 2016. 24 The report provides a rich overview of treaty practice, national legislation and national judicial decisions as forms of state practice. It also provides an overview of international judicial decisions and the work of the Commission which are sources that the Commission routinely uses as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law. It concludes that under international law there is no exception to immunity ratione personae. With respect to immunity ratione materiae, the report concludes, ambiguously, that there are either certain exceptions to immunity ratione materiae or that there is trend in favour of exceptions to immunity ratione materiae. In other words, the report could be read either as proposing that draft article 7 reflects existing law (codification) or that it reflects emerging law (progressive development). On this basis, the Special Rapporteur proposes the following draft conclusion:
Draft Article 7, titled 'Crimes in Respect of which Immunity does not Apply':
1. Immunity shall not apply in relation to the following crimes:
(i) Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture and enforced disappearances;
(ii) Corruption-related crimes;
(iii) Crimes that cause harm to persons, including death and serious injury, or to property, when such crimes are committed in the territory of the forum State and the State official is present in said territory at the time that such crimes are committed.
2.
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to persons who enjoy immunity ratione personae during their term of office.
3. Paragraph 1 and 2 are without prejudice to:
(i) Any provision of a treaty that is binding on both the forum State and the State of the official, under which immunity would not be applicable;
(ii) The obligation to cooperate with an international court or tribunal which, in each case, requires compliance by the forum State.
The conclusion that international law does not recognise any exceptions to immunity ratione personae is not controversial and it is unnecessary to explore the report's basis for this conclusion. It is the conclusion that there are exceptions to immunity ratione materiae that resulted in controversy and division with the Commission and which is considered in this article. The article will also not consider the territorial tort exception (article 7(1)(iii)) and the corruption exception (article 7(1)(ii)) proposed by the Special Rapporteur, since these were not adopted by the Commission. legislation 'recognises that in general no immunity can be invoked against to (sic) the exercise of national jurisdiction' regarding crimes within the competence of the International Criminal Court'. 32 The second approach identified in the report limits the non-application of immunity to cases involving in cooperation with the ICC. 33 Under this second approach, the report refers to two further sub-categories. In the first subcategory, the exception to immunity for the purposes of cooperation applies only to nationals of States Parties. 34 In the second sub-category, immunity is not excluded outright, but the legislation provides for a process of consultation to address any conflict that may arise between the application of immunity and the duty to cooperate with the Court. 35 Additionally, the report considers whether domestic judicial decisions provide evidence of exceptions to immunity. 36 It states that while national court judgments have been 'less uniform … it can be concluded that domestic courts, in a certain number of cases, have been accepting the existence of limitations and exceptions to immunity' in respect of 'international crimes, crimes of corruption … and other crimes of international concern …' 37 In connection with 'international crimes', the report refers to, amongst others, the Pinochet case (United Kingdom), Hussein case (Germany), Bouterse case (The Netherlands) and Ariel Sharon and Amos Yaron (Belgium). 38 Many of the cases referred to in the report, however, were civil law-related. 39 In addition to these examples of State practice, the report also traces the jurisprudence of international courts, including the 43 It is clear from the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court in the report that, on the whole, the jurisprudence provides little support for exceptions to immunity. The same conclusion arises from the report's description of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 44 The draft article proposed by the Special Rapporteur avoids the use of either "exception" or "limitations", instead using the phrase 'does not apply to'. In the report, the Special Rapporteur, in the main, refers to 'limitations and exceptions'. The reason for this, according to the Special Rapporteur, is that 'this distinction …..had been controversial in normative terms'.
B. Consideration of the Report in the Commission
As described above, the consideration of the report in the Commission was heated and tense. The first substantive point raised in connection with the fifth report concerned the third paragraph of draft article 7 (the without prejudice clause). It was felt by some that it was intended to prejudice on-going disputes concerning the relationship between articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute and customary international law rules concerning immunity. 45 The main issue of debate, however, concerned the content of the first paragraph and its consistency with State practice. It is to this issue to which the article will know turn.
While the debate on the first paragraph of the proposed draft article 7 was broad in scope and rich in depth, it is possible to identify three themes in that debate. The first theme concerned whether the draft article was supported by the authorities relied upon in the report. A second theme running through the debate concerned the criteria for the particular list of crimes provided for in the first paragraph of draft article 7. Finally, the third theme concerned the normative propriety of the paragraph. In addition to these three broad themes, and linked with the last theme, some members of the It should be noted, however, that some members of the Commission, particularly those members that believed there are no exceptions to immunity ratione materiae under international law, felt that there should be no distinction between immunity in civil context and immunity in criminal context. 49 Murphy, for example, observed that to identify whether there were cases in which immunity ratione materiae was granted for serious crimes it was necessary to look, not only at criminal cases, but also at civil cases. 50 In his view, precisely because of the large number of civil proceedingsrelated authorities, the authorities did not 'weigh unequivocally in favour of [ There was also criticism of the report's reliance on Rome Statute-related authorities. In this regard, Wood asserted that the 'the implementing laws of the Rome Statute were of dubious relevance, as they had in principle been enacted solely for the purposes of that treaty.' 53 Similarly, Rajput argued for the exclusion of legislation implementing the Rome Statute since that legislation 'related to an international tribunal where immunity did not apply.' 54 Murphy also observed that while the report 'mentioned several acts that implemented the Rome Statute, it also noted that many of them are applicable only to the surrender of persons to the Court, listing just five States that have enacted broader implementation statutes.' 55 There were, however, some members of the Commission that took the view that the principles in the Rome Statute were relevant in determining whether current international law recognised exceptions to immunity ratione materiae. 56 Peter, for example, said that 'it was the Rome Statute that should set the standard, not an obscure tradition or custom whose evolution, establishment and acceptance was questionable.' 57
It was also suggested that some of the authorities cited did not support the propositions advanced in the report. Murphy, for example, stated that the ICTY decision in Blaškić was incorrectly relied upon in the report. 58 In his view, Blaškić did not concern the right of a State to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign official but rather, the ability of the ICTY to subpoena State officials. 59 Similarly, Rajput, noted that a number of the cases relied upon in the report -for example Al-Adsani, Kalogeropoulo and Pinochet -did not support the proposition advanced. 60 Wood observed that the Dutch judgment in Bouterse had been set aside by a higher court and could therefore not be relied upon as authority. 61 As described below, these objections are generally flawed.
Many members also raised policy issues with the draft article proposed by the Special Rapporteur. 62 Wood, for example, recognised that the Commission must 'strive to strike a proper balance between the need to punish perpetrators of crimes and respect 52 72 Other members argued for the inclusion of the crime of aggression. 73 The question was asked whether the inclusion of the crime of corruption, even on a grand scale, was of greater concern to the international community than, say human trafficking or sexual slavery. 74 Finally, some members opposed to draft 7 suggested that if the Commission sought to 'make new law', then the provision should be accompanied by, and considered together with, procedural guarantees. 75 In making the case for linking draft article 7 with procedural safeguards, Murphy referred to the case concerning Ehud Barak, former Defence Minister of Israel, in the United States for alleged torture and extrajudicial killings:
Both the Israeli and the United States' Governments had supported Mr Barak's claim to immunity on the grounds that he acted in his official capacity. In granting Mr Barak immunity and dismissing the case, the District Court of the Central District of California held that the defendant was entitled to immunity where the sovereign State had officially a acknowledged and embraced the official's act. 76 Other members questioned Murphy's illustration of the importance of the procedural safeguards, arguing that it is deeply flawed. First, it was pointed out that the illustration pertains not so much to the question of exceptions but more to what constitutes an official act, so that if there is any issue that should be linked with procedural safeguards following the illustration it should be the question of official act and not exceptions. 77 Second, and related, the example illustrates that procedural safeguards could be linked to multiple areas of the topic and it is not clear why only the question of exceptions must be held ransom to the procedural safeguards issue.
As indicated above, the Commission agreed by consensus, after an indicative vote, to refer draft article 7 to the drafting committee. The drafting committee managed to reach agreement on a simplified version of draft article 7 which was provisionally adopted by the Commission after a recorded vote. Draft article 7, adopted by the Commission and which is discussed in the next section, provided as follows:
Immunity ratione materiae from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction shall not apply in respect of the following crimes under international law: 
Evaluation of Draft Article 7 Adopted by the Commission
Before providing an evaluation of draft article 7 adopted by the Commission, it is useful to briefly describe the reception that draft article has received so far outside the Commission. First, at adoption, some members opposed to the draft article, sought a recorded vote and offered explanations of vote. From a doctrinal perspective, these members expressed that the view that draft article 7 had no basis in international law as it stood or in State practice. 78 From a normative perspective they feared that the draft article would be abused and would not contribute to the fight against impunity. 79 At least one member argued that the draft article should not be adopted since it did not have the support of the most powerful States and members of the Commission from those (more) States. 80 Other members, while supporting the text, provided . 79 Kolodkin (A/CN.4/SR.3378), supra note 78, at 9 ('Of great concern was the fact that the draft article and the way in which the Commission intended to present it to the General Assembly invited unilateral actions which were contrary to international law and had a very slim potential of contributing to the fight against impunity and the protection of human rights and might be genuinely detrimental to inter- explanations of vote after the adoption to register their concern at the exclusion of specific crimes, in particular aggression 81 and corruption 82 respectively.
States have also since had the opportunity to comment on the adoption of draft article 7 in the context of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly debate on the report of the Commission. 83 It is unnecessary, at this stage, to provide a detailed account of the various views of States, but it has been reported that of the States that commented on draft article 7, twenty three had 'a predominantly positive attitude' towards the content of draft article 7, with twenty one States having a 'predominantly negative attitude' and a further five having a 'reserved or ambiguous attitude'. 84 Like those members of the Commission that opposed draft article 7, ten States are reported to have explicitly stated that draft article 7 does not reflect customary international law or is not grounded in the practice of States. 85 It is this claim that the remainder of this section will test. The views expressed in the Sixth Committee are not considered in the assessment of the Commission's mainly because they come after the fact. The question is whether is, at the time of its adoption, the Commission's draft article was 81 Tladi, (A/CN.4/SR.3378), supra note 78 at 13 et seq, ('There was no legal reason whatsoever that other crimes had been included, yet aggression, a crime that had featured in the work of the Commission since 1950, had been excluded. If the criteria by which crimes had been included concerned their jus cogens nature, there was no question that the crime of aggression ought to have been included. … If the criterion by which crimes were included was gravity, there was again no question that the crime of aggression ought to have been included …. There was no reason that the crime of aggression had been singled out for exclusion. The only reason that he could see ….was that it was a crime most likely to be committed by the powerful. The Commission had just taken the decision that the most powerful ought to be beyond the reach of justice.'); Mr Hmoud, (A/CN.4./SR3378), supra note 78, at 14 ('would have preferred aggression to be included … Although it could be an act of State, it was a criminal act committed by an individual. In that sense it was different from other crimes of international concern committed by individuals when exercising governmental authority such as crimes against humanity or war crimes.'); Mr Jalloh, (A/CN.4/SR.3378), supra note 78, at 14 et seq. ('not convinced by the explanations given by the Special Rapporteur in her fifth report on immunity as to why she wished to exclude the crime of aggression. The other core Rome Statute crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, had been included in the list of exceptions contained in draft article 7, but, arguably the most serious crime known to international law, the crime of aggression had been excluded..'); Mr Murase (A/CN.4/SR.3378), supra note 78, at 14 ('wished to express dissatisfaction over the fact that the crime of aggression had not been included in draft article 7'); Mr 89 In the AJIL Unbound Symposium, Murphy, supra note 86, at 5, makes an interesting and novel argument suggesting that the Arrest Warrant case offers support for the non-existence of exception to immunity ratione materiae: ('Further [the Fifth Report] cites to just one national court case and no international court decision supporting such an exception. To the contrary, the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case indicated circumstances where a former foreign minister might be prosecuted for crimes against humanity, but those circumstances did not include prosecution in a foreign criminal jurisdiction for an official act undertaken while in office'). However, the ICJ case concerned immunity ratione personae and not immunity ratione materiae. It is true that, at the time, the official concerned was no longer Foreign Minister, but the case concerned the circulation of the arrest warrant at the time he was Foreign Minister. But more importantly, there is nothing in the paragraph to which Murphy refers (para 61 of the Arrest Warrant case), that suggests that the Court took the four circumstances it provides as exhaustive. For example, the Court does not mention the possibility that a former Foreign Minister may be prosecuted in a foreign domestic court on the strength of a Chapter VII authorisation of the UN Security Council. crimes) do not constitute 'official acts' and are therefore not covered by immunity. 90 This line of reasoning is not considered in the current analysis for two reasons. First, the Commission has, in my view correctly, not adopted the approach that the commission of certain crimes can never constitute official acts, because surely, they can. Leaving aside that the Torture Convention defines the jus cogens crime of torture as an official act, a state can decide to engage in a policy of genocide and it is not clear why, when an official of that State is prosecuted for his or her participation in such acts, it should be disputed that the acts for which he or she is being prosecuted were undertaken in an official capacity. 91 Second, exceptions to immunity presupposes that an act is covered by immunity in the first place. If the act in question is not covered by immunities, then we cannot speak of exceptions in the first place.
As a second preliminary point, it should be emphasised that the work of the Commission, including draft article 7 on exceptions to immunity, is to be assessed on the basis of practice. In particular, the question should be whether there is sufficient practice to form the basis of the exception, either as codification or as progressive development of international law. As described earlier, in the case of codification, what is required is proof of 'extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine'. For progressive development, the existing practice need not be extensive, well-developed or even consistent. What matters is that there is some support in the practice of States. Since the Commission has adopted a composite approach to 'codification and progressive development' of international law, in which it does not (and should not) identify specific provisions as constituting either codification or progressive development, the assessment of draft article 7 requires only some evidence of practice. The evidence need not be conclusive, widespread or consistent.
The third preliminary point concerns the role of international tribunals and principles emanating from those tribunals. 92 adopted in this article, as a legal proposition they are inapplicable to the case of immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction since they concern the jurisdiction of international courts. Practice from international tribunals is therefore excluded, save where it expressly concerns immunity from national authorities.
The report, and members of the Commission -both opposed to and in support of the draft article -have advanced a variety of sources, including both civil and criminal proceedings-related authorities. The report, for example, relies on authority concerning civil proceedings and immunity of the State to justify the conclusion that there is a territorial tort exception to immunity ratione materiae. 94 Members of the Commission opposed to the draft article have similarly advanced civil cases and cases concerning the immunity of the State rather than the immunity of State officials. 95 Yet, since the topic is concerned with immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, our search for practice must be centred around materials relating to the immunity, first, of officials -and not the State itself -and, second, in the context of criminal proceedings.
In the third report on peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) (hereinafter the 'third report on jus cogens'), the special rapporteur, provided some State practice and international jurisprudence on exceptions to immunity of officials ratione materiae in the context of criminal proceedings. 96 Although the Special Rapporteur, in responding to the debate, proposed the replacement of the draft conclusion concerning immunity with a without prejudice clause, 97 it is useful still to refer to the authorities that formed the basis of those draft conclusions.
There are many cases involving the invocation of immunity of officials ratione materiae in the context of criminal proceedings before domestic courts. 98 97 The proposal to replace the relevant draft conclusions with a without prejudice was not done for substantive reasons, but rather for procedural and strategic reasons. First, as a procedural reason, the jus cogens topic was intended to address methodological issues and not substantive questions concerning consequences of specific jus cogens norms. Second, as a strategic point, the Special Rapporteur conceded that including a provision on immunity ratione materiae in criminal proceedings, would require a provision that there were no exceptions from immunity ratione personae and no exceptions in relation to civil proceedings in connection with jus cogens crimes. Since, these conclusions, which were undeniably lex lata, would have the effect of freezing this rule and preventing the further development of the law in this area. certainly, have possessed immunity ratione materiae. 100 Cassese also provides a catalogue of domestic courts' jurisprudence in which immunity ratione materiae was lifted for jus cogens crimes. 101 Some of the more famous cases in which persons ostensibly with immunity ratione materiae were subject to the jurisdiction of domestic courts include the Eichmann trial (Israel), 102 Barbie (France), 103 Bouterse (The Netherlands) -although the latter was overturned, it was not due to the immunity question, but solely due to the rule against retroactive application of the law, 104 Pinochet (Spain), Guatemala Genocide case (Spain), 105 Scilingo (Spain), 106 amongst others. Perhaps, the case most synonymous with the principle of loss immunity ratione materiae for purposes of jus cogens crimes is the Pinochet case in the United Kingdom. In that case Lord Brown-Wilkinson, Lord Hope, Lord Phillips in their Opinions, all emphasised the non-applicability of immunity ratione materiae to an international crime of a jus cogens nature. 107 In the course of the Commission debate on the fifth report, some members of the Commission sought to impugn some of the authorities referred to above as irrelevant. It was, for example, pointed out that Bouterse and Pinochet did not support the contention that immunity ratione materiae was inapplicable for serious crimes under international law. 108 With respect to Bouterse it was said that the judgment was irrelevant since it had been overturned on appeal. This assertion, which is undeniably true, is however, misleading. The Supreme Court of Appeal of the Netherlands did not overturn the judgment in Bouterse on account of immunity. The judgment was overturned on account of the principle of non-retroactive application of laws. Immunity is a procedural bar to prosecution which prohibits the consideration of the substantive issues. The consideration of whether the laws could be applied retrospectively itself indicates the non-applicability of immunity. It should be recalled that what is at issue is not whether the Court stated that immunity is or isn't applicable. What is at issue is whether the court exercised jurisdiction, and, in the case of Bouterse, it clearly did but found that there were no grounds for prosecution because the law could not be applied retroactively.
With respect to Pinochet, these members have pointed out that the opinions were not based on jus cogens as such but rather on a treaty obligation arising under the Convention against Torture. However, in Pinochet, three of the opinions specifically raised the jus cogens nature of the crime as a basis for the non-applicability of immunity. Moreover, they were all based on the nature of the crime, torture, which has been widely accepted to be a jus cogens crime. 109 At any rate, whatever the basis of the finding, it constitutes practice which, together with other evidence of practice, must contribute to the assessment of whether draft article 7 is based on the practice of States. Moreover, the Convention against Torture, to the extent that it establishes an exception from the customary international law rule on immunity ratione materiae, itself constitutes practice that must be taken into account in the assessment of draft article 7.
There is also some support in 'international practice' for the position adopted by the Commission in draft article 7. 118 Yet, in both of these cases, the courts proceeded from the premise, rightly or wrongly, that the officials in question, Minister of Defence (Mofaz) and Minister of Commerce and Trade (Bo Xilai), were entitled to immunity ratione personae. In Mofaz for example, the court concluded that 'a Defence Minister would automatically acquire …immunity in the same way as that pertaining to a Foreign Minister.' Similarly, in Bo Xilai, having recalled the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case, determined that the Chinese Minister of Commerce's functions are 'equivalent to those exercised by a Foreign Minister'. Given the invocation of immunity ratione personae, these cases can also not be authority in respect of rules relating to immunity ratione materiae.
Perhaps, the best example of a national case upholding immunity ratione materiae is the case of Hissène Habré's extradition request. 119 In that case, Habré, as a former head of State, no longer enjoyed immunity ratione personae but only (the residual) immunity ratione materiae. There, the Court determined that although Habré was no longer head of State, the immunity that he enjoyed remained. 120 Though this decision most definitely serves as a practice against draft article 7, it should be pointed out that the decision erroneously relies on the Arrest Warrant case. 121 While in the case of Habré the relevant immunity was immunity ratione materiae, the Arrest Warrant case concerned immunity ratione personae. Indeed, the majority judgment in the Warrant case specifically excluded cases of persons who no longer held office. 122 Thus, while Habre case undoubtedly constitutes practice, it should not be accorded too much weight as a subsidiary means of determining the rules of law since it is based on a misunderstanding of the primary ICJ judgment on which it is based. 123 Even discounting the incorrect reliance of the Habré case on the Arrest Warrant case, the description above suggests that the balance of authorities support the notion that there is, for criminal proceedings, an exception to immunity ratione materiae. There is, however, the problem of the logic of Jurisdictional Immunities of State case. That logic would seem to apply to immunity in the context of both civil and criminal matters. In other words, there is no a priori reason why the rule enunciated in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case would apply to civil but not criminal matters. Three brief points can be made in response. First, the distinction between jure gestiones and jure imperii applies to civil matters but apparently not criminal matters. Thus, there are certainly differences between the two-types of procedures in relation to the application of immunities. Second, and more importantly, if what is at issue are rules of customary international law, then what matters is the practice of States and if the practice suggests an exception to immunity in relation to criminal but not civil proceedings, then whether the logic of the Jurisdictional Immunities case could apply or not is insignificant. It is particularly important to observe, in this regard, that some cases upholding immunity in civil matters, have noted that different rules may apply to criminal matters. 124 Third, and related to the previous points, the ICJ in the Jurisdictional Immunities case itself makes it clear that the scope of its judgment is limited to civil proceedings against the State itself and does not necessarily extend to criminal proceedings against the officials of a State. There is also an abundance of literature supporting the idea that there are exceptions to immunity ratione materiae. 126 It is the case that writers supporting the idea of exceptions arrive at that conclusion through different pathways. Bianchi, for example, relies, inter alia, on analogical use of the principle of systemic integration in article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as a principle of 'reasonable and or even necessary aspect of legal reasoning'. 127 This principle of legal reasoning would require that, not just treaties, but all rules of international law are 'interpreted against the wider background of the international normative order', thus giving preeminence to norms of jus cogens. 128 Others, for example, Orakhelshvili, have relied on the need to give effect to the hierarchically superior norms of jus cogens over normal customary international law rules of immunity. 129 Bassiouni, on the other hand, has relied on the universal jurisdiction applicable to the respective crimes as the basis for the exclusion of immunity. 130 Still others have argued that jus cogens violations cannot be recognised as official acts. 131 Whatever the reasoning, the majority of writers seem to accept that immunity ratione materiae is not available for jus cogens crimes. There are, however, authors who argue that immunity ratione materiae continue to apply for all official acts irrespective of the type of crime. 132 Fox, for example, has advanced the substance/procedure dichotomy relied upon by the International Court of Justice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case. 133 Nonetheless, by far, the majority of authors except that there is an exception to immunity ratione materiae in respect of jus cogens crimes. 134 It is the case that there have been cases where prosecutions have not been pursued because of immunity ratione materiae. 135 Yet the weight of the authorities support the content of Draft Article 7. The practice outlined lays a sufficient basis for draft article 7 as adopted by the Commission, whether as codification or progressive development.
Conclusion
The issue of immunities under customary international law, in particular whether there exist exceptions to immunity for serious crimes under international law, is an emotive one. This is illustrated by the fact that the Commission, a collegiate body that normally adopts decisions by consensus, only managed to adopt draft article 7 after a vote, accompanied by strong -and some may say acrimonious -explanations of vote. The issue is emotive because it is a microcosm for the long-standing battle for the soul of international law: will international law -at its core -protect sovereignty and the immunity implied by it or will it pursue a brave new world by promoting accountability and justice for the victims of atrocity crimes.
Proponents of sovereignty are quick to point to the unevenness of practice and decisions of domestic courts that uphold immunity as evidence that international law remains jealously protective of immunity and continues to be grounded in the unshakeable foundations of sovereignty. Proponents of the brave new world in international law have resorted to making normative arguments about 'the good life' and the fight against impunity. This article has tried to show that the pursuit of a brave new world in international law does not depend on a radical departure from statecentric, sovereignty-respecting international law. States through their practice -a manifestation of sovereignty -have shown that they are not indifferent to the plight of human suffering and have themselves promoted this brave new world in which the imperatives of immunity are moderated by the desire for justice and accountability. In the context of the immunity, State practice reveals that, in the limited case of criminal proceedings, there is a basis for the recognition of exceptions to immunity ratione materiae. Whether this recognition will lead to other exceptions, e.g. immunity ratione personae, immunity in civil proceedings and immunity of the State itself, remains to be seen. But for now, it can be said, that the adoption of draft article 7 by the International Law Commission paves the way for the advancement of a brave new world in international law.
